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RECENT DECISIONS
Even the Court's previous interpretations of the First Amendment
do not lead to a prohibition of New York's action here. The McCollum
case,20 which held unconstitutional a "released time program," is easily
distinguished from this case in that the core of that program was formal
sectarian instruction of public school pupils in the schools during class
hours. The Regents' prayer is not sectarian instruction of any kind and
is in full accord with the heritage and traditions of our people. Some
may not accept that heritage as a matter of right, but they have no right
to compel others to ignore or be deprived of it. "Every individual has
a Constitutional right to be free from religion, but that right is a shield,
not a sword, and may not be used to compel others to adopt the same
attitude." 21 The Court has here ignored its own well reasoned position
expressed in the Zorach case:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one
chooses.... When the state encourages religious authorities by
adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it
follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the re-
ligious nature of our people and accommodates the public service
to their spiritual needs. 22
New York's use of the Regents' prayer does not fall within the pro-
hibition of the Establishment Clause as intended by the framers; is a
proper reflection of our spiritual tradition antedating the ratification of
the Constitution; and, is clearly within the area of permissible accom-
modation recognized in the Zorach case.
JAMES F. JANZ
Civil Rights: Discrimination in Private Housing-A Massachu-
setts statute' provides that no owner or managing agent of a multiple
dwelling or contiguously located housing accommodations may refuse
to rent or lease to any person on account of his race, creed, color or
national origin. As defined by the statute, "multiple dwelling" means
"... a dwelling which is usually occupied for permanent residence pur-
poses and which is either rented, leased, let or hired out, to be occupied
as the residence or home of three or more families living independently
of each other...."
Complainant, a Negro, sought to rent an apartment in a large private
apartment building, but was refused. No government assistance was
involved. He then registered a complaint with the Massachusetts Com-
mission Against Discrimination, the administrative agency charged with
the enforcement responsibility. After a formal hearing, the commission
found the respondents had engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices
2 0 McCollu v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).2 1 Supra note 2, at 487.
22 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-14 (1952).
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in refusing to rent an apartment to complainant because of his color.
Respondents appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
claiming the statute was violative of Articles I and 10 of the Declaration
of Rights in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it
invaded the right of liberty to contract and use of property. The Su-
preme Court held that there was evidence to sustain the commission's
finding that the owner and agent had engaged in unlawful discrimina-
tory practices, and upheld the constitutionality of the acl on the basis
that it did not exceed the limits of the police power. Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination v. Colangelo 182 N.E. 2d 595
(Mass. 1962).
The question of whether such Fair Housing Practice Acts are con-
stitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is of vast importance because of the increase in the num-
ber of states and cities passing such laws and the effect of such legisla-
tion, i.e., the government's interferring with and restricting an owner's
liberty to contract and property rights.
Commencing with Brown v. Board of Education,2 the United States
Supreme Court has taken great strides to eliminate discrimination in
any area involving state action.3 However, even before these decisions,
the courts did invalidate state discriminatory action in housing. In
Shelly v. Kraemer,4 the court held that the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by private contracts where-
by parties restricted Negroes from the area. But if the state court en-
forced the private discrimination contract, this constituted state action,
and as such was a denial of the equal protection guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, what constitutes state action is dif-
ficult to determine as seen in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation.5
Here, although the state seized the land by condemnation, sold it to a
private housing development corporation at cost, and gave a 25 year
tax exemption, the New York court held that there was no state action,
so the private owners could discriminate. Subsequent to this decision,
a number of states and cities have passed legislation prohibiting dis-
crimination in housing. These statutes fall into three general cate-
gories: laws extending only to public housing projects and/or urban
development,6 laws extending to publicly assisted housing, including
1 MAss. G. L. c. 151B, Sec. 4, Subsec. 6.
2347 U.S. 483 (1954).
s Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Association, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), (theatre)
Beal et al. v. Holcombe, Mayor of City of Houston, et al., 193 F. 2d 384, cert.
denied 347 U.S. 974 (1954), (golf course); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery
176 F. Supp. 776 (1959), (parks).
4334 U.S. 1 (1948).
5229 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. 2d 541, cert. denied 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
G Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, Rhode Island and Wisconsin.
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housing built with the aid of FHA or VA guaranteed loans,7 and laws
extending to private housing without government assistance.8
As seen in Shelly v. Kraemer, no constitutional right is violated by
private discrimination. Therefore, in order to uphold a statute which
outlaws discrimination in non-government assisted private housing, lit
must be done on the basis of its being a valid exercise under the police
power of the state. Many cases have shown that government may regu-
late the use of property and the right to contract on the basis of its
police power.
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor con-
tract rights are absolute, for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fel-
lows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public
to regulate it in the common interest.9
Furthermore, when the legislature passes a statute, a presumption
of constitutionality arises which courts are reluctant to set aside.
We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been
known as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or
trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its
own facts. The definition is essentially the product of legislative
determinations addressed to the purposes of government, pur-
poses neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete defi-
nition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the
7 California and Washington. See the following cases concerning statutes pro-
hibiting discrimination in publicly assisted housing: New York State Com-
mission Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., 170 N.Y.S.
2d 750 (Sup. Ct. of Westchester County, 1958), (constitutionality upheld);
Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A. 2d
177, cert. denied 363 U.S. 418 (1960), (constitutionality upheld); O'Meara v.
Washington State Board Against Discrimination, 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P. 2d
1, cert. denied 369 U.S. 839 (1961), (held unconstitutional on grounds of in-
valid classification).
8 Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire. New Jer-
sey, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. The constitutionality of these
statutes has only been challenged twice, and both times at trial court levels.
In Martin v. City of New York, 201 N.Y.S. 2d 111 (1960), the court upheld
the constitutionality of the New York City statute on the basis that it was a
valid exercise of the police power, so ". . . the individual must yield to what
legislative authority deems is for the common good." However, in Case v.
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission decided in trial court Civ. No. 39682,
D. Colo., June 2, 1961, the court declared the Colorado statute unconstitutional
on the basis it was too vague, indefinite and an unlawful delegation of legisla-
tive power to an administrative agency. Although not resting their decision
on it, the court did express doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute
under the police power since it infringed on the right of individuals to con-
tract privately.
9 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934).
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judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served
by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concern-
ing the District of Columbia . . . or the States legislating con-
cerning local affairs.'0
Thus, even though these Fair Practice Housing Laws impinge on
the individual's property and contract rights, to declare these laws un-
constitutional the United States Supreme Court must decide that these
statutes are "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious" and that the means
used and purpose intended does not bear a substantial relation to the
public health, safety or general welfare. Such a result seems highly im-
probable, considering the presumption of constitutionality of a statute
and the Court's trend against discrimination, coupled with the fact the
Court is generally more pliable in areas of social legislation. Statistics
are available which confirm the fact that a lack of adequate housing for
minority groups leads to slums, which in turn breed crime, immorality,
disease, etc."'
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court's attitude toward state
statutes prohibiting discrimination might well have been stated in Rail-
way Mail Association v. Corsi,"2 where the Court upheld a state statute
forbidding discrimination in labor organizations as non-violative of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in selection of mem-
bership, abridgement of property rights and liberty of contract.
We have here a prohibition of discrimination in membership
or union services on account of race, color or creed. A judicial
determination that such legislation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment would be a distortion of the policy manifested in
that amendment, which was adopted to prevent state legislation
designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or
color.'3
•.. it is urged that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes the state of New York from prohibiting
racial and religious discrimination against those seeking employ-
ment. Elaborately to argue against this contention is to dignify
a claim devoid of constitutional substance. Of course a State
may leave abstention from such discriminations to the conscience
of individuals. On the other hand, a State may choose to put
its authority behind one of the cherished aims of American feel-
ing by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to
anothers hurt. To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword
against such State power would stultify that Amendment. Cer-
tainly the insistence by individuals on their private prejudices
as to race, color, or creed, in relations like those now before us,
ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction than the de-
10 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
"3 See 1961 Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Book 4 on
Housing for an excellent factual report.12326 U.S. 88 (1945).
is Supra note 12, at 93, 94.
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termination of a State to extend the area of non-discrimination
beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts.14
Thus, although some will probably consider that these statutes go
too far in infringing on an individual's constitutional contract and
property rights,15 it is felt that these laws will be upheld as non-violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Aside from the constitutional question, these statutes also raise a
social question. It is one thing to tell an owner of an 120 unit apartment
building to refrain from discriminating. But it is altogether different
to require a person living in his own home who desires to rent out a
room not to discriminate. However, all the statutes enacted so far have
considered this social aspect, and have restricted the application of their
statute.'16 From a social standpoint such a classification seems desirable.'7
PETER J. LETTENBERGER
Conflict of Laws Under the Federal Tort Claims Act-A wrong-
ful death action was brought against the United States in a Federal
District Court in Oklahoma by the personal representative of passengers
killed when an airplane, owned by the American Airlines, crashed in
Missouri while enroute from Tulsa, Oklahoma, to New York City.1
The petitioners had already received a $15,000 settlement from the Air-
lines, the maximum amount recoverable under the Missouri Wrongful
Death Act.2 They sought additional amounts from the United States
under the Oklahoma Wrongful Death Act3 which contains no limitation
on the amount a single person may recover from a tortfeasor.
14 Supra note 12, Frankfurter, J. concurring at 98.
i5 See dissent of justice Kirk in reported case.
16 The broadest law enacted is the ordinance of New York City which applies to
all housing except the rental of one of the apartments in a tvo family home
where the other apartment is occupied by the owner.
17 These classifications raise the further question of equal protection of the laws.
To meet the constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
statute must apply to all persons in the same category equally, and the classifi-
cation must be made on a reasonable basis. However there appear to be a
number of valid legislative reasons for such a classification which would meet
the equal protection of the laws requirements; the policing of thousands of
small activities would be administratively impossible, the legislature could
feel the main problem area concerns those who deal in housing as a business
and not those who do it merely incidentally, or the practical reason that to
obtain proof of alleged discrimination, a pattern of discrimination must usually
be observed, which isn't available in the one room renter.
I Suit was brought on the theory that the Government, through the Civil Avia-
tion Agency, had negligently failed to enforce the terms of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act and the regulations thereunder which prohibited the practices then
being used by American Airlines in the overhaul depot of Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Under 49 U.S.C. §1425, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency is
charged with the responsibility of enforcing rules and regulations controlling
inspection, maintenance, overhaul and repair of all equipment used in air
transportation.
2 Mo. REv. STAT. §537.090 (1949). Subsequent to the origination of these actions
the Missouri Code was amended to provide for maximum damages of $25,000.
Mo. REv. STAT. §537.090 (1959).
3 OKLA. STAT., Tet. 12, §§1051-1054 (1951).
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